MERE HOUSE BOYS OR STRATEGIC AGENDA SETTERS?: THE ROLE OF AFRICAN NON STATE ACTORS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Os atores não-estatais são considerados cada vez mais como parceiros estratégicos na conformação e implementação da agenda da Governança Global Ambiental (GAG). São reconhecidos como atores importantes da GAG, pois cada vez mais influenciam a direção dos regimes e políticas internacionais ambientais. Entretanto, este artigo argumenta que os atores não-estatais africanos têm um papel muito limitado na GAG. Na maioria dos casos, estes atores não exercem poder de influência no processo decisório da GAG e participam como meros executores de programas e projetos ambientais locais. Defende-se que a principal causa dessa situação está nos imperativos organizacionais, técnicos, institucionais e econômicos que funcionam como barreiras a uma participação mais efetiva e estratégica dos atores não-estatais africanos na GAG.Palavras-chave: Atores Não Estatais; África; Governança Ambiental Global.AbstractNon State Actors are increasingly regarded as strategic partners in the setting and pursuit of global sustainable development agenda. They are important actors in the global governance for sustainable development since they influence the direction of international policy on sustainable development. However, this paper argues that African NSAs have a very limited role in this regard. In most cases, African NSAs do not gain access to the sustainable development global governance podiums but rather they only function as ‘mere house boys’ of international NSAs. The participation of African NSAs in global governance for sustainable development is very limited to the implementation of programs rather than strategic governance decision making. This is because of specific organisational, technical, institutional, economic imperatives that are required for participation at the global level which most NSAs in Africa do not posses. These are interwoven in the multidimensional matrices of problems with access to global environmental negotiations, resource base for participation, State/NSA relations, and the nature of African sustainable development NSAs.Abstract Non State Actors, Africa, Sustainable Development, Global Governance, Governance Policy.


INTRODUCTION
Globalisation has brought in a situation where policy decisions about public goods are determined in a multilevel fashion. In this way, most public goods that were formally under the ambit of national government are now global. Sustainable development is just one example. In addition, the multiplicity of actors at the global governance level, especially for sustainable development, means that solely state centric governance models are unattainable. Key to these global governance actors are Non State Actors (NSAs). NSAs have been paraded as strategic actors in the global governance for sustainable development. This is the case as they are key players in setting the agenda for sustainable development.
However, this paper argues that this activity is only a preserve of NSAs from the developed world. The participation of African NSAs in global governance for sustainable development is very limited to the implementation of programs rather than strategic governance decision making. This is against the backdrop that most sustainable development problems rest in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. In this regard, NSAs in developing countries, and Africa in particular, do not posses a strategic role in global governance policy decision making process as a result they do not effectively influence the global governance for sustainable development agenda. At best, they are only conveyor belts or 'mere houseboys' for international non state actors who transfer already packaged sustainable development programs for them to implement. African NSAs are only regarded as entry points to national governments rather than partners in strategic agenda setting. In addition, most of these 'local' African non state actors are just an extension on the international NSAs which makes their legitimacy and authority questionable. In few cases where NSA are a product of local initiative, they have very limited outreach and a very poor financial base and as a result, they get preoccupied with competing for resources and hosting of international programs from international NSA rather than devising strategic options for input and feedback to the global governance realm. The resultant problem is that the global interventions that these local NSA champion are not reflective of the sustainable development issues on the ground. Secondly, these NSAs fail to make workable partnerships with national governments since most African states are suspicious of them as agents of second generation colonisation. The local NSAs are seen to represent the interests of global and mostly Western actors rather than championing to address sustainability problems on the ground. Third is the question of sustainability of such NSAs themselves as they do not have a stable financial base. In this regard, the NSAs are disbanded once the international funding stops. This is exacerbated by the ethnical and neopatrimonial tendencies that these local NSAs portray in their program implementation. This paper therefore argues that unless local non state actors in Africa are seen as key strategic agenda setters in global governance for sustainable development, their impact on local initiatives will remain minimal. These issues despite there importance in the global governance for sustainable development debate are grossly understudied. This paper therefore seeks to fill this lacuna.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Although sustainable development is the term of the moment in current development debate, the concept remains contested. It is a very slippery and fluid concept that defies the notion of common definition. This is not however, surprising as the concept is politically loaded and as such it is a "normative concept which is based on the values of those people viewing and applying it" (Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2007: 236). In this case, the "search for a unitary and precise meaning of sustainable development may well rest on a mistaken view of the nature and function of political concepts" (Baker, 1997: 380). In this regard, several authors have offered definitions aimed at understanding the concept of sustainable development. For instance, the World Bank (1992: 34) has viewed sustainable development as "development that lasts" while Sachs (1997: 71) gives a general definition that posits that sustainable development as the "late twentieth-century expression for progress". One definition however, stands out as perhaps the most influential and often quoted in development literature. This is the one coined by the United Nations Brundtland Report which regards sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987: 43). This definition is mostly used due to its wide encompassing nature since it links sustainability to the multifaceted dynamic issues of economic, political, social and environmental imperatives of development. It is in this respect that Carter (2001: 198) argues that sustainability calls for a realisation that development "must also adhere to the physical constraints imposed by ecosystems, so that environmental considerations have to be embedded in all sectors and policy areas".

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Issues that hinge on environmental governance are increasingly cutting across political boundaries due to the nature of environmental problems. In this tune, sustainable development has become an "international problem" requiring "international solutions" so that it "cannot be solved by nation states acting alone (Carter, 2001: 225). This is exacerbated by the increasing impacts of globalisation that calls for collaborative efforts in dealing with policy imperatives that have global effects. In this manner, globalisation has brought in a situation where policy decisions about public goods are determined in a multilevel fashion. In this way, most public goods that were formally under the ambit of national government are now global. Sustainable development is just one example.
In addition, the multiplicity of actors at the global governance level, especially for sustainable development, means that solely state centric governance models are unattainable. Global governance in this respect implies a "wide and seemingly evergrowing range of actors in every domain" (Weiss, 2000: 810) forming a complex network of environmental, economic, social, and cultural arrangements and practices so that "actors from all over the world are involved in the interactions" (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler, 1998: 2-3). It must be emphasised that there is no global government for sustainable development issues rather various global governance instruments do exist. These instruments range from international coordinating bodies, institutions, and treaties. In the respect, it is generally considered that the UN Stockholm conference in 1972, which examined how a range of global environment problems affected human life, marked the early efforts to integrate issues of the environment onto the international agenda (Carter, 2001: 4). Since then various international assemblies have been constituted to discuss various environmental problems that have international impacts, (for example the Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Johannesburg conference on sustainable development of 2002). It is in these conferences that international sustainable development agendas and ideologies are shaped. In addition various international environmental treaties, protocols and institutions either emanating from these conferences or other forums do exist. These environmental regimes mandate signatory national governments to advance various sustainable development imperatives in national policy making processes. Moreover, the United Nations has specialised organisations that work to provide coordination, expertise and resources to governments and non state actors in various sustainable development aspects. Examples of these include the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPPC), the World Meteorological Organisation, and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). These organisations help national governments to effectively operationalise and implement the sustainable development agenda. In this manner, the presence of these institutions has made many countries to "at least formally, (be) committed to the principles of sustainable development and the search for international co-operation to resolve global environmental problems" (Carter, 2001:1).

ROLE OF NON STATE ACTORS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The multiplicity of actors in global governance for sustainable development means that solely state centric governance models are unattainable. Key to these global governance actors are Non State Actors (NSAs), also known as Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or Civil Society Organisations (CSO). Many definitions of NSAs exist. However, the scope for NSAs generally includes all organisations "that are institutionally separate from the state apparatus and are non profit distributing" (Tvedt, 1998:12).
NSAs have been paraded as strategic actors in the global governance for sustainable development and an "integral part of negotiation process" (Enge and Malkenes, 1993: 25). This is the case as they are key players in setting the international agenda for sustainable development. As Raustiala (1997) observes, NSAs play prominent roles in international environmental institutions which were previously the reserve of national governments. The NSAs are particularly preferred in global governance for sustainable development due to their comparable expertise and resource base that surpasses that of national governments. Moreover, NSAs have been paraded as "symbols of societal responsibility and global morality" (Tvedt, 1998: 2), and "guardians of the environment, protecting values states cannot protect" (Raustiala, 1997: 725). It is in this context that NSAs are usually referred to as the "other side of institutionalised development policy: they are seen as an alternative to governmental development policy" (Glaeser, 1997: 111). In this arena, NSAs have been very vital participants in international sustainable development institutions. They have been instrumental in influencing and shaping the global sustainable development agenda. For instance, Betsill and Corell (2001: 75) records that article 21, paragraph 1(d) of the Convention to Combat Desertification that recommends the establishment of national desertification funds, was a proposal that originated from NSAs. Another example of NSA influence is demonstrated by Carter (2001: 241) who posits that: Greenpeace and other NGOs were a powerful voice in the rejection of an Antarctic minerals treaty in favour of a further moratorium on mineral extraction and in persuading sufficient non-whaling nations to join the International Whaling Commission to enable (IWC) to enable a moratorium on whaling to be passed in 1985. NGOs had significant role in bringing about the Montreal Protocol by proposing key policy alternatives to negotiators In addition, NSAs have increasingly been pivotal in coining key jargons used by policy makers at all levels of governance that influence the sustainability negotiations. At the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, for example, NSAs coined the term "hot air" alluding to "proposals that would enable a country whose greenhouse gas emissions were below its legally binding limits to trade the difference" (Betsill and Corell, 2001: 76). Thus NSAs have increasingly been admitted at the global environmental policy formulation and advice forums thereby influencing the direction sustainability agenda. In other instances, NSAs have played this pivotal role indirectly by lobbying powerful national governments to adopt environmental decisions that they would otherwise not adopt. For instance, Carter (2001: 239) reports that the Global Climate Coalition effectively lobbied President Bush to refuse to sign the Climate Convention at Rio in 1992 and later persuaded President Clinton to take a tough negotiating stance at Berlin and Tokyo conferences.

AFRICAN NSAs AND GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE
Non State actors involved in sustainable development in Africa are a nascent but growing phenomenon. Although most of the older NSAs are mainly engaged in democratic and human rights activities, NSAs dealing with sustainable development are proliferating due to the topicality of the environmental discourse in the present century. As this paper has illustrated above, NSAs have been paraded as strategic actors in the global governance for sustainable development. This is the case as they are key players in setting the agenda for sustainable development. However, this participation is only a preserve of NSAs from the developed world. The participation of African NSAs in global governance for sustainable development is very limited to the implementation of programs rather than strategic governance decision making. This is against the backdrop that most sustainable development problems rest in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. In this regard, NSAs in developing countries, and Africa in particular, do not posses a strategic role in global governance policy decision making process as a result they do not effectively influence the global governance for sustainable development agenda. This is because of specific organisational, technical, institutional, economic imperatives that are required for participation at the global level which most NSAs in Africa do not posses.
These are interwoven in the multidimensional matrices of access to global environmental negotiations, resource base for participation, State/NSA relations, and the nature of African sustainable development NSAs as discussed below:

ACCESS TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
Institutionally, all NSAs that seek to participate at the global environmental negotiations must be recognised. For example, for the United Nations negotiations where most important environmental decisions are made this recognition requires formal accreditation. In this case "accreditation is the first gateway for NGO participation as international meetings are 'not open access regimes'" (Raustiala, 1997: 722). However, to be accredited NSAs need to posses some specific capacities and resources that should enable them make the required contributions at the international level. For instance, the 1987 Montreal Protocol against Ozone layer depletion substances requires organisations that want to be admitted for participation should be "qualified in field relating to the protection of Ozone layer". However, for most NSAs in Africa, these capacities and resources are only a night mare. Since NSAs for sustainable development in Africa are new, they do not posses strategic capabilities required to enable them be a strategic player in Sustainable Development. This for example was manifested at Stockholm where Southern NGOS accounted for only about 10% of those participating (Conca, 1995: 443) with only very few from Africa.
Even access to participation at Global Environmental Facility (GEF) which is in theory supposed to work as a mouth piece of developing countries' NSAs including Africa while provide financial resources to boost their activities, is very limited. As Raustiala (1997: 735) observes, NGO participation at GEF is a "privilege and not a right" (Raustiala, 1997: 735) because "GEF sought to incorporate those NGOs best able to supply high quality advice" (736). In particular, NGOs seeking to participate in these arrangements should have "competence and interest in the substantive agenda before the GEF Council, a wide range of views and expertise, and a balance between international, national, and local groups, specialised experience and expertise for particular meeting agenda" (Raustiala, 1997: 735) conditions which most African NSAs fall short of.
The other issue is about institutional arrangements which are mandated to admit NSAs at the international negotiations. This is the case as even after getting accreditation from the global environmental organisation concerned, the NSA members participating must be generally satisfied.
For instance the 1987 Montreal Protocol against Ozone layer depletion substances highlights that NSAs may be "admitted unless at least one third of the parties present object", and "admission and participation of the observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the parties". The irony is that the 'parties' mostly comprise of NSAs and other international players from countries in the North. Africa and other countries from the South have a very small representation in these forums. However due to prejudices that most players in the North have about Southern players, most African NSAs are not admitted even if they posses accreditation.
Another factor that contributes to problems of access of African NSAs in international sustainable development institutions is a "highly unequal distribution of power" (Conca, 1995: 445). The NSAs in Northern countries have very high influence and power in comparison with African NSAs. This is the case as "even though the civil society actors are connected trans-nationally, their geopolitical status, and the power associated with it, comes from their specific national context" (Fisher and Green 2004). In this respect Northern NSAs direct and influence the agenda and discussion framework at these forums. Unfortunately, this power determines participation and influence. For instance based on power base, an assessment of participation of NSAs at Rio revealed that "Africans were watching, the Asians listening, the Latin Americans were talking, while the North Americans and Europeans were doing business" (Clark, Friedman, Hochstetler, 1998: 12). Even the power strongholds of Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which is supposed to be a financial agency for articulating sustainable development issues in Southern states, is tilted to the South. The UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank which control the operations of GEF are predominantly representative of Northern voice rather than the Southern countries they are meant to assist. This is reflective in the GEFs four core priority areas protection of biological diversity, reduction of greenhouse gases; protection of international waters and protection of ozone layer which are mostly Northern countries agendas in sustainable development as they affect them most. In this regard most issues that are truly reflective of African countries sustainable development problems are therefore only treated in passing as they are not part and parcel of this priority list. It is in this respect for instance that Carter (2001: 234) criticises the GEF on account of its location in the World Bank which is "dominated by industrialised countries, acts as standard bearer of neo-liberal ideologies and has been historically insensitive to environmental concerns,...lack of transparency in decision making, the absence of participation by NGOs and local communities and its pursuit of a Northern agenda".
Financial and technical resources are generally regarded as prerequisites for both gaining access to, and the ultimate participation of NSAs at the global environmental negotiating institutions. It is in this respect that Raustiala (1997: 732) observes that "not all NGOs participate in environmental diplomacy and not all states benefit at all times from NGO participation" (Raustiala, 1997: 732) due to the limitation in terms of resources. NSAs from African countries, because of very low levels of economic development in these countries, fall in this category.
Most NSAs in Africa do not have a local financial base but rather depend on Northern NSAs for their support. In this regard, Northern countries and their associated NSAs, and other international organisations are pivotal financing institutions for most NSAs in African countries. However, this resource dependency has implications on the participation and influence of 'African' NSAs at the international governance level. This is the case since the few NSAs that gain access to the global environmental negotiations are not representative of African ideals since they are "not truly part of Africa,...they are all financed and controlled -directly or indirectly -by their rich Western governments. They are all managed by Europeans or North Americans" (Abdul-Raheem, 2000). In this regard, these African NSAs are just extended organs of the Western countries and even though they may make their way through to international governance institutions, they do not serve local African interest rather they present donor interests as they have "external agendas" (Edwards, 2009: 6). In the words of Kameri-Mbote (2002: 13), "it is a trite knowledge that whoever pays the piper calls the tune". As the former Britain's International Development Secretary, echoes, NSAs in Africa are "all white people from privileged countries claiming to speak on behalf of the poor of the world and there is something a little bit wrong with that," (quoted in Mclean, 2005).
This situation further results into the problems of legitimacy where NSAs are mostly looked at with suspicion by both governments and the citizenry. Since they are controlled and financed by foreign NSAs they are only viewed as "civilian branches of their home governments" (Abdul-Raheem, 2000) rather than strategic actors that should champion local sustainability issues at the global governance level. In this regard they are seen as "servants of imperialist capital" (Mudingu, 2006) "playing the role of ideological and organisational foot soldiers of imperialism" (Shivji, 2007: vi). This is the case as they are "directed by the invisible hand of the imperialists who set them up or fund them in accordance with their strategic goals" (Mudingu, 2006). This legitimacy crisis adversely limits the NSAs' role in influencing the direction of sustainable development debate at the international level. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that with financial help, the international NSAs have taken a leading role in the management and implementation of these projects. The initial point of entry for foreign NSAs is capacity building, meaning that at some stage they would let the local NSAs be instrumental in developing their policies and strategies. However "too many foreign NGOs remain reluctant to step back and let African groups take over their projects or give Africans more say in sectors such as fund-raising" (Mclean, 2005). As a result, the capacity of Africans in these key sustainable development strategic areas is never enhanced. This makes African NSAs to be perpetually under the ambit and control of foreign NSA, which unfortunately hampers their performance at the global governance level.

STATE/NSA RELATIONS
A cordial working relationship between national governments and NSAs is pivotal in making the NSAs strategic actors at the global level. This is the case as an excellent State/NSAs partnership makes NSAs and governments ably work together in articulating sustainable development issues and setting a national agenda to be championed at the international forums. However, the case in Africa is different. In most instances there is a "zero-sum game between NGOs and the state-a competitive relationship in which one actor's gain is the other's loss" (Tvedt, 1998: 34) which adversely hampers the NSAs position to be strategic actors at the global governance level. The problem is that there is always an air of mistrust and lack of cooperation between NSAs and states. This adversely affects partnerships between NSAs and Government which is central in advancing on sustainable development activities.
On the part of governments there is fear that NSA will erode their sovereignty, control and power as they are seen to represent foreign interest. As Robinson (2008: 6) argues, NSAs are seen to jeopardise "political pluralization" as their presence represents foreign interests "that may be perceived as encroaching on state sovereignty". In some cases, the NSAs through their sustainable development advocacy campaigns are accused of directly practicing politics. This situation leads to strict control of the activities of NSAs by government officials thereby limiting the extent to which NSAs can strategically position themselves at the global level. This is reflected in the Zimbabwe's Minister of Labour and Social Welfare pronouncements that NSAs are causing too much confusion to the country because they are converting their humanitarian programmes into politics . . . The government cannot allow that to happen, so we are saying they should go under scrutiny where we revise the modalities of their operations in the country (Muchena, 2004). This situation is even worse in areas when the sustainable development responsibilities of NSAs require the performance of activities that demand government accountability and transparency. This accountability responsibility of NSAs is also questioned as NSAs do not have a legitimate base since they are neither elected nor are sanctioned by government but perceived as representatives of foreign agents. This is especially the case when environmental NSAs undertake an impact assessment of government sponsored projects. In this particular one, NSAs are seen as illegitimate intruders poking their heads in areas not within their jurisdiction. Here NSAs are looked at agents that stifle personal interests of state actors. It is on this accounts therefore that governments find NSAs a "nuisance or even a threat to their interests" (BBC News 20 th February 2004). For instance in Kenya environmental NSAs that were assessing the environmental impacts of state sponsored developments on Karura Forest were "arrested in violent confrontations and other policy focused advocacy NGOs were harassed by persons believed to be acting for Government" (Kameri-Mbote, 2002:14). In such cases, governments arbitrarily deregister suspicious NSAs or refuses to register those that have the potential to go against government interests. In some cases, in a divide and rule fashion, governments form and sponsor their own "phantom 'civic bodies' to displace or at least dilute the voice of bona fide autonomous people's organisations" (Mutasah, 2007).
The relationship between the state and NSAs is conflictual as both entities heavily depend on foreign aid. In some instances this aid comes from the same international organisations and countries. As such there is stiff competition for funds between NSAs and State to the extent that the governments want to undertake activities that are supposed to be under the ambit of NSAs so as to get access to financial resources from donors. In some instances there is deliberate government strategy and policy intervention designed not to target NGOs as a channel for financing development (Tvedt, 1998: 69). Meanwhile, donor organisations continue to channel their funding through NSAs as government generally lack capacity, are corrupt and inefficient.
African governments have traditionally been seen by leaders and the citizenry as instruments for sustainable development. The argument has been that the colonialist were using the African state to advance their imperial ends rather than attaining higher levels of development. Therefore, under African leadership the state machinery is regarded as a tool that will propel African countries to higher levels of development. The coming of sustainable development NSAs on the developmental podium therefore challenges the state's authority and control over the developmental mandate. On this account NSAs are regarded as entities that are usurping the traditional responsibilities of the state. In this arena, African governments are "often uneasy about the political implications of service delivery partnerships with relatively autonomous NGOs, whose grassroots activities can lead to challenges to state authority" (Brinkerhoff, 1999:65). In this case, African governments do "not want to be seen to have failed to empower the poor in their development strategies" (Obiro 2006). This suspicion breeds hostility that stifles the effectiveness of NSAs to champion the global agenda.
On their part, because of the above factors, NSAs also mistrust the government machinery and they are not at ease in working with the government on sustainable development activities. In this regard, NSAs feel that partnering with government will "jeopardize their autonomy, integrity, and ability to pursue their own mission" (Brinkerhoff, 1999:74). In his study in Malawian, Chinsinga (2007: 98) found that all NSAs prefer to undertake their activities outside local government realm but directly to the beneficiaries on the "pretext of expediency, efficiency and effectiveness" as the government is "unduly constrained by, and often trapped in, frivolous bureaucratic procedures" (Chinsinga, 2007: 98). The state is accused of corruption and nepotism so that any finances for sustainable development projects that NSAs channel to the communities through the government machinery ends up in private wallets.
On the other hand, NSAs fear that collaboration with government will not work as governments have traditionally not accepted the role of NSAs in sustainable development governance. As one NSA manager in Africa lamented, "when the government comes to us, it is always so that we can rubberstamp what it has already decided on…alternatively, interaction may occur but fail to translate into policy" (Mulama, 2006). In this regard, NSAs regard interaction with government as a waste of time and resources and as a result engage in activities single handed.
In addition, just as the Government, NSAs view government as competitors due to the limited financial base. The NSAs compete with government for donor funds for sustainable development activities and their very survival. This situation limits the extent to which NSAs can effectively partner with state agencies for sustainable development endeavours.

THE NATURE OF AFRICAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NSAS
The nature of NSAs is pivotal is determining their positioning at the global governance podium. When NSAs are well organised, they adequately represent national aspirations in articulating sustainable development requirements at the global level. However, the organisational nature of most NSAs in Africa goes against their desire to be strategic actors in setting the global sustainable governance agenda. Several organisational and operational peculiarities of African NSAs can be identified in this regard.
In the first place, NSAs portray ethnical and neopatrimonial tendencies in their implementation of programs that make them be viewed as sectarian rather than national champions of sustainable development. In Ethiopia for instance, Tvedt (1998:27) noted that the NSA characterisation "cannot disregard the ethnic and religious dimensions which have given birth to different types of NGOs in the country". Similarly in Kenya, the "most visible (NSAs are) linked …to those ethnic groups that have been denied access to the state power (Callaghy, Kassimir, and Letham, 2001: 17). In this case NSAs regard themselves as appendices of ethnical groupings that initially championed their formation. As a consequent, nepotism and ethnicity guide their operations in-terms of program interventions and recruitment. It is not a surprise for example to find that NSAs are staffed by a majority of a particular ethnic grouping. In Tanzania for example, it was found that many organizations were "created by the wives of influential men; the husbands then secured access to prominent benefactors at the national level; and nepotism and 'know who' were important factors in determining who received services from the organizations" (Duhu, 2005: 48) This situation paralyses their ability to effectively represent national wide sustainable development necessities that can in turn be advocated at the global level.
Moreover, most sustainable development NSAs do not have the requisite organisational structures that should enable them to effectively influence policy at the international governance level. At best most NSAs in Africa are briefcase organisations, personally run by very few individuals who may also not have the required expertise in sustainable development activities they are championing. For instance Kameri-Mbote (2002:15) found that NSAs in Kenya are "new, small and without guaranteed future". There exist many "mongos (my own NGOs) and NGOs whose boards are made up of the infamous triumvirate of me, myself and I" (Mutasah, 2007). In most cases, this happens because the most driving force for the formation of NSAs is the ability to excellently craft wining proposals for donor funding rather than the desire and skills to champion sustainable development ideals. Such NSAs have their primary focus "logistics, fund-raising and communication," (Mclean, 2005) rather than sustainable development activities themselves that should have been the focal point of their operations. Meanwhile corruption and self accumulation takes centre stage when the funds are finally realised. In this regard, instead of using the finances sourced for sustainable development activities, these NSAs utilise the funds for personal use. This is manifested by the "speed with which some NGO executives have transformed themselves from modest living standards to bourgeois lifestyles complete with state-ofthe-art limousines and palace-like residences" (Nasong'o, 2002). It is therefore very doubtful that such NSAs can strategically position themselves as pivotal partners at the international sustainable development governance forums.
Information is a central point in advancing sustainable development ideals at all levels of governance. NSAs worldwide depend of information and modern communication systems to advance their programs. Much as some NSAs in Africa have modern information facilities, most of them are characterised by the lack of up-to-date information and modern communication technologies on sustainable development activities. In this realm, most NSAs are not adequately kept abreast of the current activities and programs regarding sustainability issues. To this point, Falkner (2003:78) highlights that "Saharan Africa, faced considerable difficulties in accessing relevant information about new environmental standards". This creates a challenge as most African NSAs fail to catch up on issues requiring their attention emanating from the global level.
NSAs in Africa, due to foreign resource dependency as already highlighted above, do not develop their own activities that reflect the sustainable development needs on the ground. At best, NSAs work as servants of advocating ideologies of international NSAs and donors. In this regard, there is much of ideological propagation by NSAs rather than actions and activities in the sustainable development realm. As Tvedt rightly observes, NSAs in Africa only pay "homage to certain key concepts like 'the environment', 'sustainability', 'popular participation', 'empowerment', 'reaching the poorest among the poor" (Tvedt, 1998: 84) as articulated by donors which may not reflect the institutional and cultural framework on the ground.
It must also be noted that the competition for donor resources does not only exist between NSAs and governments, but there is also unhealthy competition for financial resources among NSAs working on sustainable development projects. Instead of regarding themselves as partners in developmental endeavours, NSAs act as competitors working to outshine one another in their bid to fight for donor money. The problem is that donor money is footloose and as a result, NSAs want to pose themselves as the best in carrying out their activities so as not to lose the much needed donor resources. As Chinsinga (2007:92) highlights, in Malawi there is "strong desire among NGOs and donors to be the only organisation within a particular field and to be able to point to a demonstrable impact within the shortest time-period possible". This makes NSAs to work single handed on sustainable development projects. As Ake (2000:153) notices, NSAs are "isolated and are not usually aggregated at higher organisational levels where they may have some potential for influencing policy". However by their complexity and multidimensional nature, sustainable development endeavours require cooperation and partnerships which are pivotal in drawing various expertises that is required in the pursuit of the sustainability agenda. In addition, in a bid to outshine their opponents, NSAs use unethical strategies to mobilise the communities in their sustainable development programs. In Malawi, some NSAs use financial inducements to woo communities to participate in their activities (Chinsinga, 2007). In this regard, those NSAs that do not have money fail to win participation and cooperation of the local populace. The problem of this is that it enhances the dependency syndrome among the communities and also presents communities from benefiting from the activities of those NSAs that are under resourced.
Finally, NSAs have problems in acting as pivotal sustainable development actors at the international level because most of them are not sustainable. The question of sustainability among NSAs themselves arises as many of them do not have a stable financial base. In this regard, the NSAs are disbanded once the international funding stops or change their program orientation should a new donor surface. An example in this regard is in Zimbabwe where as "some donors have reduced their contributions, some NGOs have been obliged to change both their aims and profiles" (Tvedt, 1998: 59). This makes them lose focus in advancing the sustainability agenda they were primarily created for, thereby posing a challenge in their bid strategically position themselves at the global governance level.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
This paper has argued that NSAs are increasingly regarded as strategic partners in the setting and pursuit of global sustainable development agenda. They are important actors in the global governance for sustainable development since they influence the direction of international policy on sustainable development. However, this paper has found that African NSAs have a very limited role in this regard. In most cases, African NSAs do not gain access to the sustainable development global governance podiums but rather they only function as mere house boys of international NSAs. The participation of African NSAs in global governance for sustainable development is very limited to the implementation of programs rather than strategic governance decision making. This is because of specific organisational, technical, institutional, economic imperatives that are required for participation at the global level which most NSAs in Africa do not posses. These are interwoven in the multidimensional matrices of access to global environmental negotiations, resource base for participation, State/NSA relations, and the nature of African sustainable development NSAs.
The implications of this is that in order to strategically position themselves at the global governance level, African NSAs need to develop specific organisational, technical, institutional and economic capacities required for sustainable development endeavours at the global governance level. On their part donor institutions and international NSAs should aim at building the prerequisite capacities of African NSAs to enable them to sustainably advance the sustainability agenda, rather than only using them as justifications of their increased operations and funding. In addition, it is time that governments in Africa change their mindset so as to regard NSAs as partners in the pursuit of sustainable development agenda so as to effectively tap on the resources and skills that NSAs do posses.
Failing to do this, African NSAs will perpetually continue to operate as mere house boys of international NSAs and donors rather than strategic agenda setters in global governance for sustainable development.
In the final analysis, this paper seeks to make some methodological and theoretical recommendations for future research on the role of African non state actors in global governance for sustainable development. This is in no way meant to be an exhaustive prescription of how studies of this nature must be done but it is intended to bring out suggestions of some pertinent methodological and theoretical issues that may be taken into account for a better analysis of dynamics that shape the role of African non-state actors in global governance for sustainable development. Methodologically, there is need for empirical studies to be carried out on the same. This is the case as most of the studies on this subject rely on conceptual rather than empirical analysis and as a result they miss out on an in-depth understanding of the underlying issues that shape the actual performance of African non state actors in global governance for sustainable development. In this regard, there is a critical need for future research to utilise case study analyses that can form a basis for comparative enquiries. On the theoretical front, the weakness of studies of this nature is that they lack some theoretical grounding from which further research questions can be formulated. In this regard, there is need to go beyond the narrative and move towards some theory building that can help in bringing out the intricacies that shape the global actions and open up (or close) decision making space of non state actors at the global governance level. This can be done by using the available theoretical frameworks which can be drawn from (but not limited to) new institutionalism theories, organisational theories, international relations theories, political theories and other relevant theoretical frameworks.